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History's most important lesson is that it has not been possible to
make coercion compatible with truth.
-Yale historian John Langbein'
I. INTRODUCTION

It is a familiar scenario. U.S. officials have in custody a known, or at
least suspected, terrorist. This individual is known, or at least suspected,
to possess critical information about an imminent threat that could kill
thousands of U.S. citizens. With each passing minute, U.S. officials
grow increasingly anxious as they realize there is only one option left.
They must torture the suspect to acquire the information they need to
save thousands of innocent lives.
Despite their moral protests, these U.S. officials will inevitably
acquiesce and subject the suspect to any number of torturous methods in
* JD/MA Candidate, 2011, American University, Washington College of Law and School
of International Service.
1. Alfred W. McCoy, The Myth of the Ticking Time Bomb, THE PROGRESSIVE, Oct.
2006.
251

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

1

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 4

252

FLORIDA JOURNAL OFINTERNA TIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22

the hopes of compelling him to speak. The suspect might be chained to
a chair and severely beaten. His clothes might be taken as his religious
beliefs are mocked and his family is threatened. He could be
electrocuted, suffocated, drugged, or even waterboarded. And just as
inevitably, the suspect will divulge whatever top-secret information he
has so that U.S. officials can save the day.
It is a familiar scenario. But it is also an unlikely one.
This is known as the "ticking time bomb" exception. Under this
principle, states that have legally prohibited the use of torture can resort
to the use of torturous methods when they are faced with a large-scale
and imminent catastrophe. The ultimate goal, of course, is that the use
of these methods will compel a suspect to reveal crucial information
that will help state officials prevent a catastrophe. The only problem is
that given our current social climate, people have come to not only hope
that the suspect will divulge crucial information, but they also expect it.
Citing the ticking time bomb scenario was an especially popular
tactic of the Bush administration during the War on Terror, when senior
officials often relied on ticking time bombs to justify the torture of
terrorism suspects. Despite the government's frequent invocation of the
ticking time bomb exception to justify its acts of torture, "[m]ost
terrorism experts will tell you that the 'ticking time bomb' situation
never occurs in real life, or very rarely."2 However, this scenario was
posed with an almost alarming regularity in an attempt to garner public
support for the use of torture under any number of circumstances. By
posing these ticking time bomb scenarios, the public "can for the first
time think of torture disassociated from cruelty-[this is instead] torture
authorized and administered by decent human beings who abhor what
circumstances force them to do."3 Thanks to ticking time bombs,
torturers are touted as today's greatest heroes while victims are
dehumanized and stripped of their most basic human rights.
To the credit of President Bush, this approach proved successful. In
the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, students in a university
ethics class were asked to identify the most appropriate U.S. response to
terrorist suspects: A) execute perpetrators on sight, B) bring them back
for trial in the United States, C) subject the perpetrators to an
international tribunal, or D) torture and interrogate those involved. Most
students chose A and D-to execute and torture the suspects.4
What these students so conveniently disregarded is that the use of
torture, or even of cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment, under any
circumstance is a violation of both domestic and international law.
2. Jane Mayer, Whatever It Takes, NEW YORKER, Feb. 19, 2007.
3. David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Time Bomb, 91 VA. L. REv. 1425,
1436 (2005).
4. Id. at 1425.
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Supreme Court cases such as Brown v. Mississippi5 have held that
confessions obtained through torture or violence violate the Due Process
Clause of both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Writing for the
majority in Brown, Chief Justice Hughes stated "[i]t would be difficult
to conceive of methods more revolting to the sense of justice ... [than
using torture to compel suspects to speak]." ,6 The United States further
affirmed its dedication to protecting human dignity when it ratified both
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights7 (ICCPR) in
1992 and the U.N. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment8 (Convention against
Torture) in 1994.
Aside from strong legal precedent establishing an absolute
prohibition on torture, the ticking time bomb scenario also raises several
moral questions. As the United States glorifies the use of torture under
the justification of a ticking bomb, one must ask what we get in return.
The public assumes that after a detainee has been tortured, he or she
will surrender valuable information that could save thousands of lives.
This is rarely the case. Often prisoners have been conditioned to
withstand torture, and choose to die at the hand of their captors rather
than reveal what information they have. In other instances, victims
forfeit already-known details or create falsified evidence in an effort to
placate their torturers. This was certainly the case with Mohamed
Qatani, a case touted by the Bush administration as one of the most
successful ticking time bomb exceptions to date. Yet the administration
was silent when it was later revealed that nothing Qatani disclosed
"helped ... prevent terrorist attacks, imminent or otherwise." 9
This Article seeks to convey that under no set of circumstances,
including a ticking time bomb, is the use of torture permissible. Aside
from being morally repugnant, both domestic and international law
clearly establish that the use of torture on terrorist suspects is strictly
prohibited. In order to move beyond our past administration's mistakes,
the United States must now reassert its protection of this most basic of
human rights by denouncing the use of torture and by ensuring that state
officials neither utilize nor encourage the use of torture on suspects. As
so eloquently stated by Georgetown Law Professor David Luban,
5. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
6. Id. at 286.
7. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); 999 U.N.T.S. 171; 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967)
[hereinafter ICCPR].
8. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(1984); 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
9. David Luban, Torture, American-Style, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2005.
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"[a]ssaults on human dignity are not who we are or what we stand
for."' 0 Or at least, it should not be.

II. THE TICKING TIME BOMB THEORY
The concept of a ticking time bomb was first introduced in Jean
Lart6guy's 1960 novel Les Centurions." Set during the French
occupation of Algeria, the book's protagonist severely beats a female
Arab dissident. 12 During this process, he uncovers an imminent plot to
detonate multiple bombs across Algeria and must "race against the
clock to stop it."" 3 According to Darius Rejali, a political science
professor at Reed College, the novel's storyline "has no basis in fact."1 4
Instead, Rejali contends that Lart6guy used the concept of a ticking time
bomb to exploit the concern of many liberal societies "that their
enlightened legal systems

.

.

.

made them vulnerable to security

threats." 5 By depicting the urgency of a ticking time bomb, Lart6guy
provided French liberals with a socially acceptable rationale for the use
of torture as a means of societal preservation. 6
In the decades that followed Les Centurions, the ticking time bomb
exception required just that-an actual ticking time bomb. In 1984, a
National Committee of Inquiry in Israel concluded that the use of
controlled and moderate physical duress was acceptable during ticking
time bomb interrogations.' 7 The Committee defined ticking time bomb
interrogations as situations that occur "when a bomb is known to have
been placed in a public area and will undoubtedly explode causing
immeasurable human tragedy if its location is not revealed at once."' 8
In recent years, the necessary context for a ticking time bomb
exception to arise has grown more vague. Proponents of the theory seek
refuge in its indefinite terminology, and argue that the exception
extends to any number of scenarios. Alan Dershowitz, a vocal advocate
for the issuance of "torture warrants," purports that a ticking time bomb
scenario includes any situation which "involves a captured terrorist who
refuses to divulge information about the imminent use of weapons of
mass destruction, such as a nuclear, chemical, or biological device, that

10. Id.
11. Mayer, supra note 2.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Amos N. Guiora & Erin M. Page, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 427,433 (2005-2006).
18. Id.
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are capable of killing and injuring thousands of civilians."l 9 Legal
scholar Oren Gross has speculated that this exception may be applied to
those "truly catastrophic cases [where] the appropriate method of
tackling extremely grave national dangers and threats may call for going
outside the legal order . . . ."20 Gross declined to clarify further upon

this point, stating only that he "will not attempt to answer the important
question of what precisely constitutes a 'truly catastrophic case' . . . [but

that] it is sufficient to acknowledge that some catastrophic case is
possible." 2 1
Although the details can vary, all ticking time bomb scenarios share
three common elements: "(1) the lives of a large number of innocent
civilians are in danger; (2) the catastrophe is imminent, therefore time is
of the essence; [and] (3) a terrorist has been captured who holds
information that could prevent the catastrophe from occurring." 22 Thus,
the ticking time bomb hypothetical presupposes the perfect storm of
circumstances that in reality rarely occur. Foreign legal policy
professional Henry Shue contends that ticking time bomb advocates
idealize their hypotheticals to make their examples "better than
reality. . ."23 Advocates assume not that the detainee is a suspected
terrorist, but that he is in fact a terrorist. They assume that the detainee
divulges crucial information in a prompt and accurate fashion; that "[h]e
does not have a heart attack and pass out; he does not vomit on himself
and have a psychotic break; he does not tell a plausible diversionary lie
that wastes the time available." 24 Perhaps most importantly, they
assume that once the critical information is revealed that the detainee's
handlers will possess the self-restraint to abandon the principle of
"practice makes perfect." 25
But is this really the case? If history serves as any indication, it
certainly is not. Instead, Luban warns that "at this point, we verge on
declaring all military threats and adversaries that menace American
civilians to be ticking time bombs whose defeat justifies torture." 26
Indeed, this rationale has been promoted by ticking time bomb
advocates around the world. Take for example the oft-cited case of

19. McCoy, supra note 1.
20. Oren Gross, Are Torture Warrants Warranted? PragmaticAbsolutism and Official
Disobedience, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1481, 1487 (2003-2004) (emphasis in original).
21. Id. n.26 (emphasis in original).
22. Vittorio Bufacchi & Jean Maria Arrigo, Torture, Terrorism and the State: a
Refutation of the Ticking-Bomb Argument, 23 J. APPLIED PHIL. 355, 358 (2006).
23. Henry Shue, Torture in Dreamland:Disposing of the Ticking Bomb, 37 CASE W. RES.
J. INT'L L. 231 (2005-2006).
24. Id at 233.
25. Id.
26. Luban, supra note 3, at 1443.
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Abdul Hakim Murad, who was detained in Manila in 1995.27 The local
government touted the ticking time bomb exception here as an
indisputable success. Officials claimed that after sixty-seven days of
severely torturing Murad, they obtained details which allowed them to
stop a plot to blow up a dozen trans-Pacific aircrafts carrying as many
as four thousand innocent passengers. 2 8 During this time, Murad
suffered incessant beatings and the use of techniques that included
burning his genitals with cigarettes.29 Yet, it was later revealed that
none of the information obtained by Manila police was the result of
torturing Murad.o Instead, all critical information regarding the bomb
plot was discovered on Murad's laptop within minutes of it being
seized.3 1 One Filipino officer even testified in a New York court that all
supposed details gained from the torture were fabrications fed to Murad
by the Philippine police.3 2
This is a familiar tactic employed by governments asserting the
ticking time bomb exception: after brutally torturing (sometimes to the
point of death) a terrorist suspect, governments will glorify the
information they received in an effort to escape global condemnation
for their acts. This was a particularly popular technique during the Bush
administration's reign during the War on Terror. President Bush
staunchly defended the use of an "alternative set of procedures" 33 on
Abu Zubaydah, an associate of Osama bin Laden's, by claiming that the
intelligence produced by these methods stopped a "succession of lethal
ticking bombs ... includ[ing] 'Al Qaeda's efforts to produce anthrax,' a
terror assault on U.S. Marines in Djibouti with 'an explosive-laden
water tanker,' 'a planned attack on the U.S. consulate in Karachi using
car bombs' . . . ." Just four days after Bush's speech, the FBI reported
via the New York Times that it had received key information from
Zubaydah only with the use of non-coercive measures, and that other
agencies had already discovered most of this "supposedly 'vital'
intelligence." 35
Thus the rationale behind the ticking time bomb exception is tenuous
at best. As international scholars and governments embellish or simply
fabricate the successes of torture under ticking time bomb scenarios,
one cannot, and should not, overlook the gaping holes in this theory.
27.
28.
29.

McCoy, supra note 1.
Id.
Id.

30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.

34. Id.
35.

Id.
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Not one of these scholars or governments has established the set of
circumstances required before this exception may be raised. Instead, it
may simply be enough that a detainee is suspected of possessing
knowledge about a suspected imminent threat. Given these lax
boundaries, it is unsurprising how often detainees are subjected to
torture under the guise of a ticking time bomb. However, the inquiry
into the ticking time bomb exception should not end with a critique of
the theory's vague criteria. We must now turn to the question of
whether a legal exception to the prohibition of torture is ever permitted.
III. LEGAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE TICKING TIME
BOMB EXCEPTION

To create a legal exception permitting the use of torture would be a
direct violation of both national and international laws. The American
legal system is based on the ideals of due process and human dignity.
To allow an individual to be tortured, even under the ticking time bomb
scenario, would not only violate decades of court precedent and
statutory law but also the very foundation of our legal system: the
Constitution. The use of torture under any circumstance is also clearly
prohibited by international treaties such as the U.N. Convention against
Torture and the ICCPR, both of which the United States has ratified and
thus undertaken the responsibility to enforce.
A. U.S. Law
In the same speech where he justified the torture of Abu Zubaydah,
President Bush also encouraged "Congress and the Supreme Court [to]
simply set aside their constitutional qualms about these 'tough
methods"' 36 so that the CIA could continue to "obtain information that
[could] save innocent lives." 37 However, President Bush never claimed
that his opponents lacked a legitimate constitutional argument against
the use of torture in a ticking time bomb scenario; he simply felt that
their "qualms" (or what some could call "valid legal arguments") should
be set aside. Unfortunately for President Bush and his fellow ticking
time bomb advocates, the laws cannot simply be pushed aside when
those in charge disagree with them. An examination of the basic
principles that guide our legal system reveals that the use of torture
under any circumstance constitutes a breach of U.S. law.
We must look no further than the Constitution to see that the
prohibition against torture is deeply ingrained in our legal system.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
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Among its enforcement of several procedural rights, the due process
standard of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments also protects a
person's substantive right to life and liberty-a direct result of the
Framers' desire to protect human dignity. Accordingly, the due process
standard implicitly prohibits the use of torture on the basis of protecting
human dignity. A closer look at the precedent of due process cases
suggests that no exceptions to the prohibition of torture can be made,
including a ticking time bomb.
The Supreme Court has articulated the right to substantive due
process since the days of Brown v. Mississippi. In Brown, multiple
defendants were forced to endure brutal interrogation techniques until
they confessed to a local murder. One defendant was hanged, tied to a
tree, and whipped; two others were made to strip naked and lay over
chairs while they were beaten with leather whips with buckles
attached.3 8 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Hughes referred to
this treatment of the defendants as "torture" no less than five times. The
Court ultimately held that the officers' conduct was offensive to a sense
of justice, holding "it would be difficult to conceive of methods more
revolting to the sense ofjustice than those taken [here] . . . the use of the
confessions thus obtained . . . was a clear denial of due process." 39

Through its interpretation of due process the Court has thus determined
that using torture to compel a suspect to speak violates their Fourteenth
Amendment rights.
The Court expanded its interpretation of due process rights in Rochin
v. California, where it found that violent conduct that "shocks the
conscience" also violates due process. In Rochin, police believed the
After
suspect swallowed a capsule containing narcotics.41
unsuccessfully attempting to remove the pills from the suspect's mouth,
police took Rochin to a local hospital and ordered doctors to pump his
stomach so that they could retrieve the capsules.42 Similar to its
approach in Brown, the Court highlighted the brutally invasive methods
used by police to extract evidence from a suspect and held that "[t]his is
conduct that shocks the conscience . .. it has long ceased to be true that

due process of law is heedless of the means by which otherwise relevant
and credible evidence is obtained." 4 3
The Court thus established that in determining whether a suspect's
due process rights were violated, it must first consider the methods used
to compel the suspect to speak. This standard was further enunciated in
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Brown, 297 U.S. at 281.
Id. at 286.
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
Id. at 166.
Id.
Id. at 172.
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Breithaupt v. Abram, where the Court drew a clear distinction between
conduct that "shocks the conscience" and that which occurs in everyday
life. In Breithaupt,the Court considered whether taking a blood sample
from a suspect to determine his blood alcohol content violated his due
process rights. Drawing a comparison to Rochin, the Court held that
taking a blood sample was a procedure that could occur in "everyday
life" and was therefore not shocking to the conscience nor violative of
the suspect's due process rights."
These standards as enunciated by the Supreme Court establish that
the use of violent or invasive methods to compel a suspect to speak
violates that individual's due process rights. If the interrogational
hanging and whipping of a suspect in Brown was considered offensive
to a sense of justice, it seems unfathomable that the electrocution,
beating, or waterboarding of a suspect could survive this due process
standard. Furthermore, the methods used against detainees are often
shocking to the conscience per the Rochin standard: needles have been
driven underneath a suspect's fingernails, life-saving medication has
been withheld, and the lives of suspects' children have even been
threatened. Placed in the context of a ticking time bomb, many people
are willing to overlook the constitutional guarantee of a suspect's due
process rights. However, it seems that the use of torture against any
suspect is clearly prohibited by the due process protections of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
While there can be no argument that due process protections extend
to U.S. citizens, there are some who allege that non-citizen detainees
should not be afforded the due process protections of our Constitution.
While the Supreme Court has yet to directly address this issue in the
context of torture, it has issued multiple landmark decisions in which
other due process rights have been extended to detainees.4 5 The
Supreme Court most recently addressed this issue in the 2008
Boumediene case, in which the Court emphasized that "[t]he laws and
44. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436-37 (1957).
45. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (asserting that the Constitution's
separation-of-powers structure, including the guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, extend to both citizens and foreign nationals who have the capacity to litigate in
federal courts); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (rejecting the use of military
commissions to try enemy combatants for their lack of appropriate procedures as required under
domestic and international law); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (asserting that
citizens who are found to be illegal enemy combatants retain their due process right to assert
habeas corpus and must be given a "meaningful opportunity" to challenge their detention);
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that non-citizens who are detained as enemy
combatants have a statutory right to challenge the lawfulness of their detention, and further
establishing that U.S. courts can assert jurisdiction over the habeas claims of enemy combatants
if one of two criteria is satisfied: the detainee is either a U.S. citizen or located within the
jurisdiction of the U.S. courts).
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Constitution are designed to survive, and remain in force, in
extraordinary times. Liberty and security can be reconciled .... ' 6
In that vein, many have called upon President Barack Obama to
"embrace his campaign's promise to end [the] denial of due process to
suspected terrorists and [to] disavow the Bush administration's
unconstitutional policies . . . ."4 The Obama administration has yet to

live up to its promise, instead filing a motion in 2009 to dismiss the civil
case of Rasul v. Rumsfelc 8 by seemingly im lying that "aliens held at
Guantanamo do not have due process rights.
Despite this disappointing stance, the ultimate decision-making
authority regarding the application of due process rights remains with
the Supreme Court. The Court has consistently posited that certain due
process rights extend to detainees, which raises an important question:
do the protections of due process simply serve as a legal smorgasbord
from which we can pick and choose which rights we want to apply at
any given time? This has certainly not been the case when it comes to
the rights of U.S. citizens, and there is no evidence that this same
standard should not apply to detainees.
Like the Supreme Court, Congress has also sought to protect human
dignity by passing legislation that provides for the criminal and civil
liability of perpetrators of torture. The federal anti-torture statute can be
found at Section 2340A of Title 18 of the U.S. Code.so This law
authorizes criminal prosecution for anyone who commits or conspires to
commit an act of torture as long as the act occurred outside the United
States and either (1) the person who carried out the torture is a national
of the United States or (2) the person who carried out the torture is in
the United States, irrespective of the nationality of either the torturer or
the victim of the torture.5 1 Section 1350 of Title 28, more commonly
known as the Torture Victim Protection Act, similarly extends civil
liability to any perpetrator of torture. 52 The United States clarified the

46. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 770.
47. Editorial, The New Guantanamo, CITY ON A HILL PRESS, June 3, 2010,
http://www.cityonahillpress.com/2010/06/03/the-new-guantanamo/.
48. Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 414 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2006).
49. Daphne Eviatar, Obama DOJ: 'Aliens Held at Guantanamo Do Not Have Due
Process Rights,' WASH. INDEP., Mar. 13, 2009, http://washingtonindependent.com/33829/
obama-doj-aliens-held-at-guantanamo-do-not-have-due-process-rights. The D.C. Circuit Court
eventually dismissed all claims in Rasul, and the Supreme Court declined review in 2009.
However, the Supreme Court has yet to offer its official stance on the due process rights of
detainees regarding the use of torture.
50. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A(a)-(c) (2000).
5 1. Id.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1991).
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impact of these laws in a report submitted to the United Nations in
1999,53 in which it claimed that:
Torture is prohibited by law throughout the United States. It is
categorically denounced as a matter of policy and as a tool of
state authority. Every act constituting torture under the
Convention constitutes a criminal offence under the law of the
United States. No official of the Government, federal, state or
local, civilian or military, is authorized to commit or to instruct
anyone else to commit torture. Nor may any official condone or
tolerate torture in any form. No exceptional circumstances may
be invoked as a justification of torture. United States law contains
no provision permitting otherwise prohibited acts of torture or
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment to be
employed on grounds of exigent circumstances (for example,
during a "state of public emergency") or on orders from a
superior officer or public authority, and the protective
mechanisms of an independent judiciary are not subject to
suspension. The United States is committed to the full and
effective implementation of its obligations under the Convention
throughout its territory. 54
The United States thus used this report as an opportunity to assure both
the United Nations and its international peers, in no uncertain terms,
that the use of torture under any circumstance was prohibited by its
domestic laws.
The United States has employed multiple legal avenues to ensure
that its laws clearly prohibit the use of torture and provide no judicial
protection for perpetrators of this crime. The Framers undertook to
protect human dignity with the due process provision of the Fifth
Amendment, which was later made applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. When called upon to interpret the protections
of due process, the Supreme Court has steadily maintained that methods
of compelling a suspect to speak which are revolting to a sense of
justice or which shock the conscience are clearly in violation of due
process; what little case precedent is available also suggests that the
provisions of due process extend to non-national detainees. The United
States has further ensured the protection of individuals from torture
through multiple statutory provisions that provide for the criminal and
civil liability of perpetrators of torture. Nowhere in U.S. legal history
53. United States of America, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 19 of the Convention, 1 6, delivered to the Committee Against Torture,
CAT/C/28/Add.5 (Feb. 9, 2000).
54. Id. at 4-5.
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has Congress, the Supreme Court, or any other legal body carved an
exception for the use of torture, including in ticking time bomb
scenarios.
B. InternationalLaw
Under international law, torturers are known as hostis humani
generis, or "enemies of all humanity."" The international community
has undertaken to proscribe the use of torture since the drafting of the
Third Geneva Convention, 6 which was adopted in 1929 to dictate the
treatment of prisoners of war. Although the Third Geneva Convention
does not explicitly define torture, its use is qualified as a grave breach
of the Convention.5 7 However, the Convention's deficiencies became
evident during World War II, as the Nazis employed new and brutal
methods of torture. The international community responded by seeking
more effective instruments to prohibit the use of torture. Today, the U.S.
is bound by two of these covenants, which expressly forbid the use of
torture under an circumstance: the ICCPR5 8 and the Convention
against Torture.5 A closer examination of the text of these two
covenants reveals that they allow no derogations from the prohibition of
torture, including ticking time bomb scenarios.
The ICCPR shares one deficiency in common with the Third Geneva
Convention in that they both fail to define an act of torture. However,
the impact of the Nazi's cruel medical experiments and mass torture
techniques is clearly reflected in the language of Article 7, which states
"[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment. In particular, no one shall be subjected
without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation." 60
Article 10 follows by holding that "[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty
shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity
of the human person." 6 1
The U.S. Senate ratified the ICCPR in 1992 but included five
62
reservations, five understandings, and four declarations. Among these
was the Senate's declaration that Articles 1 through 27 of the Covenant
55. Sanford Levinson, "Precommitment" and "Postcommitment": The Ban on Torture in
the Wake ofSeptember 11, 81 Tnx. L. REV. 2013, 2017 (2002-2003).
56. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, arts. 3, 130, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III].
57. Id. art. 130.
58. ICCPR, supra note 7.
59. Convention Against Torture, supra note 8.
60. ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 7.
61. Id. art. 10.
62. U.S. reservations, declarations, and understandings, International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 138 Cong. Rec. S478 1-01 (daily ed., Apr. 2, 1992).
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were not self-executing,63 which was interpreted in an Executive Report
to mean that the Covenant would not create a private cause of action in
U.S. courts." Although critics argued that these reservations
significantly undercut the authority of the ICCPR, it remains binding on
the United States as a matter of international law.
The notion of human dignity similarly served as the foundation for
the Convention against Torture, which came into force in 198765 and
was ratified by the United States in 1994. This Convention holds a
unique place in international law, as it is the only treaty that deals
exclusively with the issue of torture. The Convention is also unique in
that it was the first treaty to explicitly define an act of torture, as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him
or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of
any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not
include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or
incidental to lawful sanctions.
The Convention is divided into three sections, the first of which
establishes the standards of compliance for ratifying parties. This
section commits parties to take effective measures to prevent acts of
torture; among these is the requirement that parties codify torture as a
criminal offense under their domestic law69 and assert jurisdiction over
acts of torture committed by or against their citizens.7 0 The Convention
also extends universal jurisdiction to those perpetrators who cannot be
extradited.7 1 This allows states to claim criminal jurisdiction over
individuals whose crimes were committed outside the state's boundaries
and regardless of that person's nationality, country of residence, or
other ties to the prosecuting country.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

138 Cong. Rec. S4781-84 (1992).
S. Exec. Rep. No. 102-23 (1992).
Convention Against Torture, supra note 8.
Id.
Id. art. 1.
Id. art. 2.
Id. art. 4.
Id. art. 5.
Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

13

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 4

FLORIDA JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW

264

[Vol. 22

While it is clear that both the ICCPR and the Convention against
Torture explicitly prohibit the use of torture, each also contains a
specific clause of particular importance given the context of a ticking
time bomb. Article 4(2) of the ICCPR sets forth that no derogations
from Article 7's absolute prohibition of torture shall be permitted. 2 The
Convention against Torture extends that protection even further,
ensuring that "[n]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a
state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other
public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture." 7 At the
time of its ratification, the U.S. Senate claimed no reservation to (and
had thus fully accepted) the Article establishing that no "exceptional
circumstances" defense may be used to justify torture.7 4 Thus, despite
the popularity of the ticking time bomb defense, this justification has
been expressly forbidden by two of the international community's most
powerful treaties addressing the prohibition of torture.
This has done little to deter proponents of the ticking time bomb
defense, as they inevitably claim that the interrogational methods used
on suspects do not amount to torture. However, even these lesser forms
of abuse are prohibited by the Convention against Torture, which not
only forbids the use of torture but also the use of cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment [CID]:
Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under
its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture as
defined in article 1, when such acts are committed by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
official or other person acting in an official capacity.75
Some choose to dramatize the difference between torture and CID, and
argue that CID is preferable because it is the "lesser" offense. Yet in
practice, there is little distinction between CID and torture. Even the
perpetrators of these acts have acknowledged that there is little
distinguishing the two, as methods of CID implemented at Guantanamo
were commonly referred to as "torture lite": 76
18- to 20-hour-a-day questioning for 48 out of 54 days, blasting
prisoners with strobe lights and ear-splitting rock music,
menacing them with snarling dogs, threatening to hurt their
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 4(2).
Convention Against Torture, supranote 8, art. 2(2).
Levinson, supra note 55, at 2014-16.
Convention Against Torture, supranote 8, art. 16.
Luban, supra note 9.
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mothers, and humiliations such as leading them around on
leashes Pfc. Lynndie England-style, stripping them naked in front
of women, or holding them down while a female interrogator
straddles them and whispers that we've killed their comrades.
Although these techniques might not amount to torture under
international law, they are undeniably cruel and degrading. Thus, even
lesser acts of interrogational cruelty constitute a violation of the
Convention.
Some proponents of the ticking time bomb theory take even greater
creative liberties when interpreting the language of these treaties, and
argue that interrogational torture is legitimized by an existing state of
war such as the War on Terror. However, both the ICCPR and
Convention against Torture provide that neither the threat of war nor an
existing state of war can be cited as a justification for torture.7 This
principle is not only protected by these covenants, but it is also widely
supported throughout the international community. In 2002 the Council
of Europe published a set of guidelines regarding the use of torture and
CID which stated: "The use of torture or of inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment is absolutely prohibited, in all circumstances,
and in particular during the arrest, questioning and detention of a person
suspected of . .. terrorist activities, irrespective of the nature of the acts
the person is suspected of . . . The Council also rejected the notion

that states can derogate from the prohibition of torture or CID under
certain circumstances based upon the acts of the terrorist suspect.8 0 To
draw a comparison to U.S. constitutional law, not even the most
compelling state interest can justify deviation from the international
prohibition of torture.8 1
The international prohibition of torture is absolute and unwavering.
In addition to being protected by such binding treaties as the ICCPR and
the Convention against Torture, this prohibition is considered to be both
"a fixture of customary international law" 82 and "one of the few genuine
norms of jus cogens."8 3 As such, this prohibition overrides state
sovereignty and is therefore binding upon states even absent their
consent. There are few other practices as widely condemned as the use
of torture, and no international treaty permits derogation from this
77. Id.
78. ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 4(2); Convention Against Torture, supra note 8, art. 2(2).
79. Levinson, supranote 55, at 2016 (citing Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe on Human Rights and the Fight Against Terrorism, Guideline IV (2002)).
80. Id.
81. Levinson, supra note 55, at 2016.
82. Id. at 2013.
83. Id.
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prohibition. Although the War on Terror and the ticking time bomb
scenario has been widely touted by the United States as an exception,
neither international law nor custom lends support to this claim.
C. Doctrines ofDefense
The right to be free from torture is non-derogable and thus absolute.
As such, there are no circumstances in which a state may suspend this
right. International bodies in particular have taken a hard-line approach
to enforcing this principle:
A person who commits such an act cannot be excused, even if:
(i) he engaged in torture as a last resort; (ii) he suspected or knew
the victim was a terrorist; (iii) he suspected or knew that the
victim could provide information, saving dozens of lives
threatened by an imminent and very serious terrorist attack; and
finally, (iv) he caused non-lethal temporary suffering under
medical control.84
However, the War on Terror has renewed international debate regarding
the validity of a ticking time bomb exception.
It is commonly argued that the ticking time bomb exception falls
under the protection of two closely related defense doctrines: selfdefense and necessity. Both doctrines were prominently featured in the
notorious "Torture Memo," in which John Yoo claimed that the United
States was within its legal obligations "even if it uses interrogation
methods that might constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment, so long as their use is justified by self-defense or
necessity."8 Yet the ticking time bomb scenario fails to satisfy the
elements of these doctrines as defined by national and international law.
As such, the principles of self-defense and necessity offer no protection
to perpetrators of torture. At best they serve as a legal smokescreen to
allow perpetrators of torture to operate outside of the law.
The notion that self-defense extends to state action can be seen in
international law as far back as the nineteenth century. The elements of
this doctrine were first articulated in the 1842 Caroline case, which
involved a diplomatic dispute between the United States and the United
Kingdom.8 6 Out of this case arose the so-called "Caroline Criteria,"
84. Paola Gaeta, May Necessity Be Available as a Defence for Torture in the
InterrogationofSuspected Terrorists?,2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 785, 787-88 (2004).
85. Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen. to William J. Haynes,
II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep't of Def. 59 (Mar. 14, 2003) [hereinafter Torture Memo].
86. Case Records, The Avalon Project, British-American Diplomacy: The Caroline Case
(July 27, 1842), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/1 9th century/br-1 842d.asp.
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which required states claiming self-defense to show:
[A] necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no
choice of means, and no moment for deliberation. It will be for it
to show, also, that the local authorities .

.

. even supposing the

necessity of the moment authorized them to enter the territories
of [another state] at all,-did nothing unreasonable or excessive;
since the act justified by the necessity of self-defence, must be
limited by that necessity, and kept clearly within it.87
The right of states to claim self-defense has since evolved into a
recognized principle of international law. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter
provides that nothing within will "impair the right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
88 A panel of judges at the International Court
the United Nations. ...
of Justice (ICJ) later spoke to the permanency of this doctrine by
asserting that "[t]here can be no doubt that the issues of the use of force
and collective self-defence .

.

. are issues which are regulated both by

customary international law and by treaties . . . ."89
The elements of this doctrine have remained intact since they were
first enunciated in Caroline.For a state to properly argue self-defense, it
must prove (1) necessity; (2) reasonableness; and (3) proportionality.
These elements are closely paralleled in our domestic system, where the
doctrine of self-defense is held to be a valid common law claim under
which the same elements apply.9 0
In the wake of 9/11, it was John Yoo who first explored these
similarities between national and international standards. However, Yoo
sought not to draw a mere legal comparison but also to establish that
"[t]he right to self-defense, even when it involves deadly force, is
deeply embedded in our law, both as to individuals and as to the nation

87. Id. The elements of self-defense were identified in a letter from Dan Webster to Lord
Ashburton, which was drafted during the negotiation stages of the case on April 24, 1841.
88. U.N. Charter art. 51.
89. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. United
States), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 27 (June 27) (Judgment).
90. See United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1230 (1973) (asserting that "[t]he
defender must have believed that he was in imminent peril . . . and that his response was
necessary to save himself therefrom. These beliefs must not only have been honestly
entertained, but also objectively reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances"); see also
Shlomit Wallerstein, Justifying the Right to Self-Defense: A Theory of ForcedConsequences, 91
VA. L. REv. 999, 1024 (2005) (identifying proportionality as a required element in the selfdefense claim and defining it as "limit[ing] permission to use defensive force to only that
amount which would be proportionate to the potential harm the aggressor would inflict on the
defender").
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as a whole." 9 1 Thus when asked to interpret the legal standards
governing detainee interrogations, Yoo justified the use of torture by
arguing the existence of a national and international right to selfdefense. He also argued that the events of 9/11 triggered the nation's
constitutional right to undertake acts of torture in self-defense which,
although they "might arguably cross the line ... [are methods] needed
to elicit information to prevent a direct and imminent threat. 9 2 What
Yoo failed to disclose is that the relevant case law reveals that
interrogational torture, even when "justified" by a ticking time bomb, is
never protected by a claim of self-defense.
1. Reasonableness and Proportionality
To begin, there are no circumstances in which a perpetrator can
prove the reasonableness or proportionality of his acts under the ticking
time bomb scenario. To show that his conduct was reasonable, a
perpetrator must prove that his actions were prompted by the "'clear and
imminent danger' of a terrorist attack." 9 3 Yet under the ticking time
bomb scenario, U.S. officials are torturing detainees not because they
know of an imminent attack, but to determine if such a threat exists.
These perpetrators thus presume the existence of a threat and act in the
absence of evidence suggesting otherwise. But in the absence of
evidence speaking to an officer's reasonable belief, courts cannot
presuppose that a clear and imminent danger existed at the time the
detainee was tortured. Courts are then left to gauge the reasonableness
of torturing a detainee without any evidence speaking to an actual
threat.
In making its inquiry into the reasonableness of an official's
conduct, U.S. courts will also consider the methods used to compel a
detainee to speak. U.S. officials have commonly employed severe
methods of compulsion that included walling,9 4 stress positioning, and
waterboarding.9 But with severe action comes severe reaction, and
victims of these methods have been known to inhale their own vomit,

91.
92.
93.

Torture Memo, supra note 85, at 77.
Id. at 74.
Kevin Jon Heller, Torture, Necessity, Self-Defense--and John Yoo's Fundamental

Dishonesty, OpINio JuRIs (Apr. 28, 2009), http://opiniojuris.org/2009/04/28/torture-necessityself-defense-and-john-yoos-fundamental-dishonesty/.
94. Walling is a method whereby the detainee will stand with his heels against a wall and
repeatedly have his body slammed into by an interrogator.
95.

David Cole, The Torture Memos: The Case Against the Lawyers, N.Y. REV. OF

BooKs, Oct. 8, 2009, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2009/oct/08/the-torturememos-the-case-against-the-lawyers/?pagination-false.
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lose consciousness, or even stop breathing.96 While these acts are
unreasonable by their very nature, we must also place them in the
context of the actor's overall goal of compelling a detainee to speak. It
is unfathomable that a court would find torture to be the most
reasonable method of reaching this goal, as it seems unlikely that a
detainee who is incoherent, unconscious, or dead is in any position to
provide valuable information to his torturers.
U.S. officials citing a ticking time bomb as justification for torture
also fail to satisfy the proportionality element of a self-defense claim.
The methods of interrogational torture employed by U.S. officials
constitute the use of deadly force, or force that creates a substantial risk
of causing death or serious bodily harm. 97 Although the doctrine of selfdefense allows for deadly force, the Model Penal Code maintains that
"[t]he use of deadly force is not justifiable .. . unless the actor believes
that such force is necessary to protect himself against death [or] serious
bodily injury . .. "98 Yet in the context of a ticking time bomb, U.S.

authorities have already detained the victim. The power dynamic is
skewed in favor of the torturer, and the detainee is truly at the mercy of
his captors. No interrogator could plausibly claim that under those
circumstances, he believed that he was personally at risk of serious
bodily injury or death at the hand of the detainee. There is certainly no
proportionality in the torture of a detainee who poses no immediate
threat to his torturer.
It might be argued that self-defense applies to ticking time bomb
scenarios because the perpetrator was acting in defense of other U.S.
citizens. This argument fails for one glaringly obvious reason: a claim
of self-defense is only applicable when the conduct is aimed at
defending oneself While the desire to defend the lives of U.S. citizens
is certainly noble, it also disqualifies the act of torture from being
protected under self-defense. Although the theory of a third-party selfdefense claim might be appealing to some, it is not a recognized
doctrine under domestic law. For any claim of self-defense to succeed,
the perpetrator must have believed that he was personally at risk. If he
did not possess this belief at the time the torture was committed, there
was no proportionality in his conduct. Because the context of a ticking
time bomb is such that the elements of reasonableness and
proportionality will never be met, an individual perpetrator will never
successfully launch a claim of self-defense under U.S. law.
The United States has also sought to defend its acts of
interrogational torture by invoking the principles of self-defense under
96. Mark Benjamin, Waterboardingfor Dummies, SALON, Mar. 9, 2010, http://www.
salon.com/news/feature/2010/03/09/waterboardingfor dummies/index.html.
97. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
98.

MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 3.04(2)(b) (1962).
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international law. However, this argument fails for similar reasons. To
begin, the claim that interrogational torture falls under a state's right to
self-defense is fundamentally unreasonable due to the nature of the act
itself. Academic Deirdre Golash states that, "Superficially, torture is of
a kind with other forms of violence, seeming to differ from them only in
degree."99 Many states might agree, and argue that torture is permissible
because it is simply another form of interrogational violence that has
historically been accepted under international law.
However, Golash also contends that the justification of torture with
the ticking time bomb exception is invalid because "torture, especially
where it is directed to breaking the will, is qualitatively different from
acceptable forms of coercion and transgresses the limits of permissible
punishment or self-defense, regardless of the de ee of the [suspect's]
guilt or the magnitude of the evil to be avoided."' Thus, there exists no
mitigating factor under international law that would excuse an act of
torture aimed at breaking a detainee's will. Torture under this context is
held to be both fundamentally wrong and absolutely prohibited, and the
existence of such factors as a detainee's guilt will not serve to tip the
scales of justice back in favor of the torturing state.
A state claim of self-defense is also inherently unreasonable because
it directly contradicts official U.S. policies regarding the use of torture.
Four years after 9/11, the Bush administration posited that:
No circumstance whatsoever, including war, the threat of war,
internal political instability, public emergency, or an order from a
superior officer or public authority, may be invoked as a
justification for or defense to committing torture . . . The U.S.
Government does not permit, tolerate, or condone torture, or
other unlawful xractices, by its personnel or employees under any
circumstances.
This pledge was immediately renewed by the incoming Obama
administration in 2009, as seen by its prioritization of Executive Order
13491. Among its other provisions, the Order ensured that any
individual in the custody or effective control of an officer, employee, or
agent of the U.S. government would not be subjected to torture or CID,

99. Deirdre Golash, Torture and Self-Defense, in INTERVENTION, TERRORISM, AND
TORTURE: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO JUST WAR THEORY 263, 264 (Steven P. Lee ed.,
2007).
100. Id.
101. U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Addendum to Second Periodic Reports of States
6-7, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/48/Add.3 (May 6,
Parties Due in 1999: United States of America,
2005).
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particularly during interrogations. 102 Therefore, the argument that acts
of interrogational torture are permissible is inherently unreasonable
because it so blatantly defies etablished U.S. policies regarding the use
of torture.
The context of a ticking time bomb also fails to satisfy the
proportionality requirement of a self-defense claim, largely because no
right to anticipatory or preemptive self-defense exists under
international law. As such, states do not have the right to invoke selfdefense when their actions are dictated by fear of a future attack. After
the attacks of 9/11, the Security Council specifically held that for the
self-defense doctrine to apply,
[a]n attack must be underway or must have already occurred in
order to trigger the right of unilateral self-defense. Any earlier
response requires the approval of the Security Council. There is
no self-appointed right to attack another state because of fear that
the state is making plans or developing weapons usable in a
hypothetical campaign.103
Thus, states claiming self-defense must not only prove that an armed
attack was underway at the time defensive force was used, but also that
the force was a proportionate response to that attack. Yet a vital element
to the ticking time bomb theory is that the torture serves as a tool for
preventing a future attack. Accordingly, the use of torture is never
proportionate because the perpetrators are "responding" to an attack that
has not yet occurred.
The proportionality argument is of particular importance under
international law because the prohibition of torture is considered to be a
fundamental right. As such, the intentional infringement upon this right
by a state will never be considered a proportionate response to a
supposed terrorist threat. As Golash argues, "our right to force other
persons to refrain from harming others must stop short of violating their
inalienable rights--even if they propose to violate the inalienable rights

of others."1 04
It is this contention that forms the very basis of our international
legal system. People possess certain basic rights that are of such
importance that an entire body of law has been crafted to protect them.
This includes the right to be free from torture. There exists no
circumstance by which a state's violation of this right may be justified,
including a detainee's prior conduct, definite guilt, or possible "critical
102. Ensuring Lawful Interrogations, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893, 4894 (Jan. 27, 2009).
103. MARY ELLEN O'CONNELL, THE MYTH OF PREEMPTIVE SELF-DEFENSE 5 (American
Society for International Law 2002).
104. Golash, supranote 99, at 269.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

21

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 4

272

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22

knowledge." What's more, the fact that this person has allegedly
committed some vile act may never be interpreted as a forfeiture of his
basic rights. Never may one person's basic rights be prioritized over
another's, as "[t]here is a sense in which the number of people saved is
simply irrelevant to the wrongness of doing grave harm to innocents in
order to save them."' 0 5 A state can truly do no greater harm than to
intentionally infringe upon someone's fundamental human rights. As
such, there are no circumstances by which interrogational torture would
be deemed proportionate to the prevention of a possible terrorist attack.
There are literally no circumstances under which the United States or
one of its officials could successfully launch a claim of self-defense.
Both national and international laws have long established that the party
claiming self-defense must prove that their actions were both
proportionate and reasonable in light of the circumstances. Given the
absolute prohibition on torture and the nature of interrogational torture,
there are no circumstances in which the doctrine of self-defense would
extend legal protection to either an individual perpetrator or to the
United States, regardless of the existence of a ticking time bomb.
2. Necessity
Necessity has traditionally been viewed as one element of the larger
claim of self-defense. Yet, recent years have seen a shift in legal
thinking, and the doctrine of necessity is now considered to be its own
theory of defense. Necessity first gained judicial recognition in 1954
with the national case of Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan v. Federation of
Pakistan.10 6 In its decision, the Court declared "that which is otherwise
not lawful is made lawful by necessity."10 7 Since that time, necessity
has been recognized as its own doctrine under both national and
international law.
There exists one primary distinction between self-defense and
necessity, in that necessity allows a state official to take action against a
detainee in the absence of a personal threat. Necessity is justified by the
belief that "in particular circumstances officials may undertake
exceptional actions to achieve their legitimate goals, such as protecting
national security, that would otherwise be prohibited if the normal rule
of law governed during normal conditions." 0 8 Although this principle
105. Id. at 264.
106. Oka Obono, Extending the Doctrine of Necessity, Bus. DAY, June 1, 2010,
http://www.businessdayonline.com/index.php?optioncomcontent&view-article&id=1 151 0:ex
tending-the-doctrine-of-necessity-i&catid=96:columnists&Itemid=350.
107. Id.
108. Thomas P. Crocker, Overcoming Necessity: Torture and the State of Constitutional
Torture,61 S.M.U. L. REV. 221, 224 (2008).
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has been interpreted in a variety of ways, necessity is almost always
cited in the context of a ticking time bomb.
Necessity is also largely described as a balancing test whereby a
detainee's rights are weighed against national security interests. This is
in effect a cost-benefit analysis, where U.S. officials must weigh the
pros and cons of torturing detainees in light of a ticking time bomb.
National courts have contributed to the formation of a comprehensive
six-prong test for invoking this defense:
The defendant must prove (1) that he was faced with a choice of
evils and chose the lesser evil; (2) that he acted to prevent
imminent harm; (3) that he reasonably anticipated a causal
relationship between his conduct and the harm to be avoided ...
(4) that there were no other legal alternatives to violating the law.
Additionally, the fifth factor is that "the Legislature has not acted
to preclude the defense by a clear and deliberate choice regarding
the values at issue . . . a sixth factor is that the necessitous

circumstances were not caused by the negligent or reckless acts
of the defendant. . . ."109
Domestic courts also scrutinize necessity claims in light of the
reasonability standard. Accordingly, a perpetrator must have possessed
a reasonable belief that his actions were necessary at the time the
detainee was tortured. Given the manner in which U.S. courts have
interpreted the necessity defense, it is evident that perpetrators of torture
can never successfully invoke this doctrine in the context of a ticking
time bomb.
U.S. courts have clearly sought to limit the circumstances in which
necessity can override human rights. In truth, the elements of this
doctrine make it nearly impossible for U.S. officials to successfully
invoke the necessity defense, because "[r]eal emergencies don't come
neatly emplotted"" 0 in this ideal set of circumstances. As such, the
requirements of the necessity doctrine will never fully be satisfied by
the facts surrounding a ticking time bomb scenario.
The most direct barrier to applying the necessity defense to incidents
of ticking time bombs is the requirement that perpetrators first pursue
legal alternatives before resorting to torture. This element requires that
there be "no reasonable legal alternative to avert the greater evil . . .
other reasonable alternatives would need to be deployed, if time
permits."'"1 But U.S. officials resorting to interrogational torture seek to
109. John Alan Cohan, Torture and the Necessity Doctrine, 41 VAL. U. L. REv. 1587,
1609-10 (2006).
110. Crocker, supranote 108, at 255.
111. Cohan, supra note 109, at 1620.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

23

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 4

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

274

[Vol. 22

accomplish but one goal: to compel detainees to reveal information
about presumed terrorist plots.
This alone suggests that officials lack reliable information about the
alleged plots. They do not know when or where the attack will take
place, or who the primary actors will be. It stands to reason that U.S.
officials are generally uninformed as to imminence of a terrorist plot,
and accordingly must first pursue legal methods of compelling detainees
to speak. The law is silent as to what those other methods may be;
perhaps U.S. officials may extend legal immunity to detainees or offer
protection to detainees and their families in exchange for accurate
intelligence. However, the key principle remains that "if there were
other means to obtain the information that did not involve harm to [the
detainee , officials would no longer be justified in resorting to
torture." 2 Consequently, perpetrators who decline to first pursue legal
methods of compulsion cannot lawfully invoke the protections of
necessity.
Those who defend ticking time bombs by citing the necessity
doctrine are ultimately seeking legal protection where there is none. Our
nation was founded upon a set of principles that were later embodied in
the Constitution. These principles cannot be pushed aside simply
because the nation has entered a state of emergency. As the Court in
Boumediene explained, "[s]ecurity subsists . . . in fidelity to freedom's
first principles. Chief among these [is] freedom from arbitrary and
unlawful restraint and the personal liberty that is secured by adherence
to the separation of powers."" 3 To allow for the infringement of our
core constitutional values would serve only to "legitim[ize] the practice
of torture [and] ultimately alter [] central, constitutional commitments
government is not empowered to override basic
l14 The
....
constitutional protections based solely on our national security status.
Even in those limited circumstances when the government can balance
state interests with our rights, "core aspects of those rights remain
immune to claims of purported state need."' 1 5
The necessity doctrine serves but one purpose: "[W]hile torture
remains outside of law, the defense of necessity . .. provides an excuse
from criminal punishment."" 6 Yet this reveals the circular nature of this
question: necessity serves to justify that which would otherwise
constitute criminal conduct, but national law insists that the use of
torture can never be justified. As a result, the necessity defense as
112.

Bounediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 769 (2008).

113.

Id.

114.
115.
116.

Crocker, supra note 108, at 226.
Id. at 266.
Zachary R. Calo, Torture, Necessity and Supreme Emergency: Law and Morality at

the End ofLaw, 43 VAL. U. L. REv. 1591, 1595 (2008).
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defined under U.S. law will never be applicable to ticking time bomb
situations.
Just as the necessity doctrine is an available defense under national
law, it has similarly been acknowledged as a valid doctrine under
international law. Yet just as the ticking time bomb exception fails to
satisfy the elements of necessity under national law, it also fails to
satisfy the elements under international law. In 1999, the Supreme
Court of Israel addressed the conduct of investigators acting on behalf
of the state. The Court's decision was interpreted to hold that:
(i) "the 'necessity' defence . . . is open to all, particularly an

investigator, acting in an organizational capacity of the State";
(ii) the "necessity" exception is likely to be invoked in instances
of "ticking bombs"; and (iii) the Court [i]s "prepared to accept
that in the appropriate circumstances, . . . investigators may avail

themselves of the necessity defence, if criminally indicted."'

17

In the years following this decision, international case law consistently
upheld the validity of the necessity doctrine. Perhaps more importantly,
necessity was deemed to be a legitimate defense by such organs as the
ICC, which included in Article 31 of the Rome Statute a provision
allowing states to invoke this defense. 1 8
International law draws a clear distinction1 between self-defense and
necessity in that "[t]he crime perpetrated in a situation of necessity
harms an 'innocent' person, namely someone who has not deliberately
caused that situation." 1 9 This doctrine thus allows state officials to
torture innocent victims in the name of necessity. But this defies the
very nature of a ticking time bomb scenario, where the victim has been
detained for his supposed involvement with terrorist activities. At no
time do U.S. officials believe the detainee to be innocent, and thus may
never cite the necessity defense to legitimize their acts of interrogational
torture.
Academic Paola Gaeta encourages us to further scrutinize the factual
requirements of the necessity defense when applied to the ticking time
bomb exception. With regard to Article 31 of the Rome Statute, Gaeta
interprets the necessity doctrine to possess three distinct elements: the
actions "(i) must be appropriate and capable of averting the danger; (ii)
cause harm which is limited to that absolutely necessary to forestall the
threat and (iii) do not cause greater harm than the one sought to be

117. Gaeta, supra note 84, at 788.
118. Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 31(1)(d), July 17,1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
119. Gaeta, supra note 84, at 791.
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avoided." 20 These elements are subject to a strict interpretation. This
requires a perpetrator to prove that at the time of the torture, he had no
doubts that the detainee possessed the information he needed and would
divulge that information in an honest and timely manner.121 Again, there
are no circumstances under which a perpetrator could be reasonably
convinced of these elements. Without this absolute causal link between
the detainee and the alleged terrorist act, there is no basis to assert
necessity.
In the unforeseeable event that a state can prove all these elements, it
must still surpass one final limitation: necessity may only be invoked
where the act itself has not been explicitly prohibited under
international law. This principle is embodied in Article 2(2) of the
Convention against Torture, which states that no exceptional
circumstances may be invoked as a justification to torture.122 John Yoo
alleged that this provision was not binding on the United States because
it has not been directly incorporated into our national laws. However,
Yoo's logic is once again flawed, as the official policy of the United
States is to prohibit the use of torture under all circumstances; what is
more, no national laws have been drafted that extend the necessity
defense to circumstances of interrogational torture.
Even if the necessity doctrine is available under domestic law, the
inquiry does not stop there:
If necessity countenances torture as required by circumstances, it
is not simply that the derogation knows no principled boundaries
within United States legal practice, nor that it undermines a
concept of persons on which political legitimacy relies, but also
that it knows no principled boundaries in unraveling an entire
trend in international human rights law .. 123
There is considerable evidence speaking to customary nature of the
prohibition of torture. This principle is not only embodied in such
instruments as the Convention against Torture and the Rome Statute,
but can also be seen in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which states: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment."' 24 Regional treaties such as the

120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Convention Against Torture, supranote 8, art. 2(2).
123. Crocker, supra note 108, at 273.
124. University Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217 (III) art. 5 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
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European Convention, the American Convention, and the African
Charter have also institutionalized the absolute prohibition of torture.12 5
In interpreting the scope of the prohibition of torture, international
legal bodies have consistently affirmed the non-derogable nature of this
right. The European Court of Human Rights addressed the use of
practices similar to those employed by U.S. officials, including stress
positions and hooding, and asserted that these methods constituted
inhuman and degrading treatment.1 26 The Court later "ruled that the
norm against torture has such a central place in democratic society ...
that '[e]ven in the most difficult circumstances, such as the fight against
terrorism and organized crime ... [it is prohibited] in absolute terms [to
employ the use of] torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment."'l 27 No international legal entity has ever allowed a claim
of necessity to circumvent the prohibition on torture. Thus, the absolute
prohibition of torture is now an accepted principle under customary
international law, and at no time will the necessity doctrine serve as
legitimate justification for its use.
Despite claims that the doctrines of self-defense and necessity
extend legal protection to perpetrators of torture, this is simply not the
case. Although both doctrines are accepted theories under national and
international law, the elemental requirements of each reveal that neither
doctrine is ever applicable to circumstances of ticking time bombs.
IV. OUR "JACK BAUER" CULTURE: MORAL CONSIDERATIONS TO THE
TICKING TIME BOMB EXCEPTION

Those who had a hand in crafting the national and international laws
regarding torture sought to protect the most basic of human rights.
Because these laws were intended to protect fundamental human
dignity, the prohibition on torture was also intended to be absolute.
Thus, neither domestic nor international laws provide for any
derogation from this principle. However, the War on Terror revealed an
astonishing number of U.S. officials who were willing to operate
outside of the law in order to torture detainees, often under the guise of
national security, unflinching patriotism, and yes, ticking time bombs.
125. Crocker, supra note 108, at 274 (citing European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 3, Nov., 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 22; African Charter
on Human and People's Rights art. 5, June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21
I.L.M. 58; Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
126. Id. (citing Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 65-67 (1978)).
127. Id. (citing Selmouni v. France, 1999-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 149).
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Yet these officials wanted more than to simply operate outside of the
laws; they wanted to create entirely new ones that conferred upon them
special torture authority.
Frankly, these officials wanted to be Jack Bauer.
But this massive game of make-believe has set a disturbing trend. As
one U.S. official stated, "If you don't violate someone's human rights
some of the time, you probably aren't doing your job."l 2 8 This is not
simply the misguided characterization of one U.S. official with no
legitimate authority. No, this was the account given by an American
official with supervisory authority over suspects.
What is even more distressing is that Americans today tend to agree
with this assertion. The September 11th attacks drastically altered our
cultural landscape and as a result, our perception of torture. Rather than
view torture as a gross violation of personal rights, many feel that this is
a necessary and appropriate weapon in the War on Terror. This belief
has permeated our cultural senses and is largely perpetuated by the
media.
We must look no further than our own TVs to see just how deeply
this principle has become ingrained in U.S. culture. Prior to the 9/11
attacks, less than four acts of torture appeared on prime-time television
every year.129 As of 2007, this number had jumped to over one
hundred.13 0 Not only has the quantity of torture scenes changed, but so
has the general framework of a torture scenario. As noted by David
Danzig, a project director at Human Rights Watch, "the torturers have
changed. It used to be almost exclusively the villains who tortured.
Today, torture is often perpetrated by the heroes."'31 Over the past
decade, one of the most beloved television heroes has been Jack Bauer,
protagonist of the series 24.132 The character was the lead agent of the
fictional Counter Terrorist Unit, and for good reason: by the end of an
hour-long program, Jack Bauer will have inevitably saved the country,
and the world, from some horrific terrorist plot.
How does Bauer always manage to save the world in one hour or
less? Almost exclusively with the use of torture. The first five seasons
of 24 alone contained 67 individual torture scenes, 133 almost all of
which were justified under the ticking time bomb exception:
"[F]requently, the dilemma is stark: a resistant suspect can either be
128. Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations;
'Stress and Duress' Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities,

WASH. PosT, Dec. 26, 2002, at AO1.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Mayer, supra note 2.
Id.
Id.
After being on the air for 9 seasons, 24 was cancelled in May 2010.
Id.
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accorded due process-allowing a terrorist plot to proceed--or be
tortured in pursuit of a lead ... [w]ith unnerving efficiency, suspects are
beaten, suffocated, electrocuted, drugged, assaulted with knives, or
more exotically abused. . . .
Without fail, the tortured suspect will
divulge whatever critical information Bauer needs to foil yet another
terrorist plot.
Howard Gordon, the show's lead writer, acknowledges that the
entire premise of 24 is the ticking time bomb exception.13 Gordon has
written Bauer to be an "unwilling" participant in the torture of suspects;
in one episode, he tells the President "I don't wanna bypass the
Constitution, but these are extraordinary circumstances."'
Indeed,
Bauer is portrayed as the ultimate patriot, willing to sacrifice his ideals
for the good of the nation. Joel Sumow, co-creator of the series, says
this is exactly the point. The series toys with America's post-9/11 fears
about threats to our national security, and 24 conveys that "there are not
a lot of measures short of extreme measures that will get it done . . .
America wants the war on terror fought by Jack Bauer. He's a
patriot." 137
However, Jack Bauer is a patriot who has convinced our society that
in a ticking time bomb scenario, it is entirely appropriate and necessary
to disregard a suspect's rights. He is a patriot who has convinced our
society that should you choose to torture a suspect, you will suffer no
legal consequences. He is a patriot who has convinced our society that
the words of a well-known Newsweek article were correct in claiming
that it is "Time to Think About Torture."' 3 8
But what impact does this have on Americans' ethical standards? In
the words of David Luban, "the torturer is [now] a conscientious public
servant, heroic the way that New York firefighters were heroic, willing
to do desperate things . . . the time bomb clinches the great divide

between torture and cruelty ... ."139 In the ticking time bomb scenario,
America not only allows torture, it demands it. Indeed, the Jack Bauer
approach to torture has seeped into the American consciousness and
drastically compromised our legal and moral values. Even members of
the Supreme Court have been wooed by the Bauer methodology, with
Justice Antonin Scalia having once "defended the use of torture on
suspects by citing the show's hero [as] having 'saved Los Angeles ...

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Luban, supra note 3, at 1439.
Id. at 1441.
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he saved hundreds of thousands of lives. Are you going to convict Jack
Bauer?"" 4 0
Scalia did not seek to convey that torture was legally permissible; he
was instead providing valuable social commentary. Given the public
opinion after 9/11, men like Jack Bauer were touted as war heroes, and
the U.S. courts were rue to hold these men accountable for their actions.
What is worse, similarly high-ranking officials have taken an even more
passive approach to the crime of torture, and feel no need to even justify
its use. Instead, the use of torture can be shrugged off, because really, it
is what it is: Illegal. But what does that matter? Even former President
George W. Bush has taken a shockingly blas6 stance on this issue. Just a
few months ago, he admitted during a public appearance that "Yeah, we
waterboarded Khalid Sheikh Mohammed . . . I'd do it again to save

lives." 41 Not once did Bush offer any insight into how U.S. officials
could bypass the blatant restrictions on the use of methods such as
waterboarding. That is because Bush knows that nobody is asking this
question.
Yet shows such as 24 have had such a worrisome impact on
American values that U.S. Army Brigadier General Patrick Finnegan,
dean of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, has personally
expressed his concerns to the team behind 24. Accompanied by three of
the most experienced military and FBI interrogators in the country,
Finnegan approached the show's writers to assert his belief that the
"show's central political premise-that the letter of American law must
be sacrificed for the country's security-was having a toxic effect." 42
Finnegan argues that not only is the show hurting the country's image
internationally, but that it also has a seriously detrimental impact on the
training and performance of our nation's troops. Finnegan, a lawyer
himself, trains his cadets to consider not only what is legal on the
battlefield but also what is moral. Since the creation of 24, Finnegan
notes it has become increasingly difficult to convince cadets that
America must respect both the rule of law and human rights regardless
of a terrorist's actions.
In the context of 24, cadets instead feel that while "torture thay cause
Jack Bauer some angst, it is always the patriotic thing to do."' What
these cadets do not realize is that in the context of U.S. and international
law, Bauer would be subject to criminal liability. Joe Navarro,
140. Gary Levin, GroundbreakingFox Series '24' Finally Runs Out of Time, USA TODAY,
May 19, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/life/television/news/2010-05-19-2419_CVN.htm.
141. Paul Owen, George Bush Admits US Waterboarded 9/11 Mastermind, GUARDIAN,
June 3, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/03/george-bush-us-waterboardedterror-mastermind.
142. Mayer, supra note 2.
143. Id.
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Finnegan's colleague and himself one of the FBI's top experts in
interrogation techniques, also notes that cadets do not consider the
psychological impact of torturing another person. As Navarro maintains,
"only a psychopath can torture and be unaffected. You don't want
people like that in your organization."'" To make allowances for the
ticking time bomb exception would only perpetuate the unrealistic
expectations of our current "Jack Bauer culture" and allow our nation's
cadets to both glorify the impact of torture and downplay the certain
ramifications that follow.
Americans tend to disregard these issues in favor of the doctrine of
necessity and argue that laws can occasionally be bypassed to prevent
the greater harm.145 However, legal scholars tend to disagree with this
principle. Even if liability could be avoided, it seems that our society has
totally unrealistic expectations on the returns of torturing a suspect.
Navarro himself has conducted some twelve thousand interrogations,
and firmly stands by his contention that torture is not an effective
method of compelling suspects to speak: "These are very determined
people, and they won't turn just because you pull a fingernail out."' 46
Instead, Navarro insists we must consider the suspect's background. For
example, a fanatical Islamist terrorist is not only expecting to be
tortured, but is likely welcoming it. These are people who want to be
martyred. In the situation of a ticking time bomb, a suspect would be
even more unwilling to talk because "they know if they can simply hold
out several hours, all the more glory-the ticking time bomb will go
Offvil47

Not only have suspects been conditioned to withstand torture, but
they have also been trained on what to say if they do feel compelled to
speak. In the event of an actual ticking time bomb, the suspect will likely
hold out for as long as they can. If they are unable to withstand the
torture, it is still "very likely that terrorists will give their interrogator
false information to gain more time for the bomb to explode." 48
A closer examination of Qatani supports these contentions. Qatani
had clearly been conditioned to withstand torture, like many suspects in
his position. When he did risk revealing crucial information, he resorted
to textbook answers found in an al-Qaeda handbook. Logs kept of
Qatani's treatment suggest that on the few occasions when honest
disclosures were obtained, it was "not when al-Qatani was under duress

144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad, The Torturing Debate on Torture, 29 N. ILL. U. L.
REv. 1, 36 (2008-2009).
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but when his handlers eased up on him." 49 However, under the guise of
a ticking time bomb, the government persisted with its torture of Qatani
for over three months. At the end of this period Qatani was found to be
completely incoherent, and the government had obtained no information
about a terrorist threat, imminent or otherwise.
Qatani also raises crucial but often overlooked questions regarding
what restrictions should be placed on the ticking time bomb exception,
such as possible timelines. Although this exception calls for torture in
the event of an imminent threat, there is still an established chain of
command that must be followed before a detainee may be tortured. As
such, it is highly unlikely that a U.S. official would be able to extract
critical information before an attack is launched: "Clearly, there is a
certain chain of command to whose attention the facts regarding the
planted time bomb must first be brought, and the latter should then move
forward to gather information, locate the suspects, arrest them, and
interrogate those who really have knowledge of the planted time
bomb." so This is not as imminent a process as the public believes.
Realistically, there must be more efficient ways to utilize the
government's time and resources than to torture a suspect who may or
may not be compelled to speak and who may or may not reveal
legitimate information.
Another issue to be considered is with whom can we trust the task of
separating fact from fiction? Even the most skilled interrogators struggle
to determine what information is valid and what is not. Testing has
revealed that professional interrogators only perform "within the 45 to
60 percent range in separating truth from lies-little better than flipping a
coin."' 5 ' Even if a detainee were to divulge legitimate information, that
information is often overlooked. To make allowances for the ticking
time bomb exception would merely perpetuate the illusion that
interrogators can easily separate fact from fiction, when in fact there
might be more effective methods of obtaining reliable intelligence.
Indeed there are more reliable methods of compelling a suspect to
speak, such as the well-established method of empathetic
interrogation. 152 U.S. Marines first employed this technique during
World War II in an effort to extract legitimate intelligence from
Japanese captives, and the government has successfully utilized this
method ever since.15 3 It has been argued that some of the government's
most reliable intelligence from al-Qaeda was gained using this

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Inside the Interrogation of Detainee 063, TIME, June 12, 2005, at 2.
Wattad, supra note 148, at 36.
McCoy, supra note 1.
Id.
Id.
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approach. 5 4 Not only was the information received correct, but it was
also received in such a way that the evidence was later admissible in
court-which is not the case with any statement given as a result of
torture.
Bureau agent Dan Coleman reveals why empathetic interrogation is
a much more successful approach than torture. "Have any of these guys
[who torture suspects] ever tried to talk to anyone who's been deprived
of his clothes? . . . He's going to be ashamed and humiliated and cold.

He'll tell you anything you want to hear to get his clothes back." 55
Instead, Coleman argues that empathy is the most undeservedly
undervalued interrogation tool. In his interrogations, Coleman will first
establish a rapport with the suspects to convey that he can be trusted.
Ultimately, detainees see Coleman as a confidante and not as an
interrogator, and as a result, the information they reveal is almost always
reliable.
Although the media has glorified the use of the ticking time bomb
exception, this is a morally reprehensible attempt to justify the violation
of another person's human rights. This attempt to coerce a suspect to
speak has rarely, if ever, led to the prevention of a ticking time bomb
situation. Instead, suspects are often conditioned to withstand torture and
will remain silent or feed incorrect information to officials until the
bomb has had a chance to explode. Other methods of compelling a
suspect to speak, such as empathetic interrogation, have proven much
more successful and not only protect the admissibility of statements but
do not require an interrogator to break the law. Combining the moral
considerations of ticking time bombs with the relevant laws prohibiting
torture, the only logical conclusion is for the ticking time bomb
exception to be abandoned completely.
V. CONCLUSION

Given the recent War on Terror, discussion of the ticking time bomb
exception has not been put in the proper context: "The real debate is not
between one guilty man's pain and hundreds of innocent lives. It is the
debate between the certainty of anguish and the mere possibility of
learning something vital . .. .""s' The belief that interrogators receive

crucial information from tortured detainees is a popular misconception,
and one with very little truth behind it. By continuing discussion of the
ticking time bomb exception, we are merely perpetuating the misbelief

154. Id.
155.
156.

Id.
Luban, supra note 3, at 1444.
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that torturing a suspect and thus violating his dignity is an appropriate,
and successful, solution.
There is no valid argument that justifies the ticking time bomb
exception. The United States has prohibited the use of torture since
Brown, and federal statutes extend not only criminal liability to
perpetrators but also civil remedies to victims. International treaties lend
even less support to this exception, particularly the ICCPR and the
Convention against Torture. These treaties not only prohibit the use of
torture under any circumstance but also have allowed no room for
derogations from this principle. Although the doctrines of self-defense
and necessity are both valid defense theories under national and
international laws, there are no circumstances under which these
doctrines extend to ticking time bomb scenarios.
To permit torture in a ticking time bomb scenario would not only
violate national and international law, but also belittle our global moral
standards. There should be no question that the use of torture is
unethical. As stated by Admiral Mayorga, "[t]he day we stop
condemning torture-although we tortured-the day we become
insensitive to mothers who lose their guerilla sons-although they are
guerillas-is the day we stop being human beings."' 5 7 By making
exceptions for the use of torture, even under the guise of a ticking time
bomb, we would thus be compromising the most basic principles of
humanity.

157.

Levinson, supra note 55.
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